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Introduction 
 
 United States Attorneys are some of the most important actors in the American justice 
system. Appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, they “well-connected, middle-
aged, politically active members of the establishment1.” They set the agenda for prosecuting and 
shape the American criminal justice landscape. US attorneys do not depend on any single actor, 
and work in a strategic environment that affords them substantial discretion (Eisenstein).  
 While strong research does exist about US Attorneys, it focuses primarily on their 
behavior in office, once they are already past the nomination process. The literature discusses the 
nomination process for US Attorneys, but prior to this research, no data existed on US Attorney 
short lists. Short lists are immensely important in understanding who gets chosen for a 
Presidentially-appointed and Senate-confirmed post and why they were seen as the best choice. 
Thus, I decided to fill this gap and focus my research on US Attorney short lists, to deepen our 
understanding of this highly salient and important figure in our justice system. 
 Using a sample of randomly selected judicial districts, I compiled information about US 
Attorney short lists when a vacancy occurred. I used various independent variables to compare 
trends across time and space and measure how these variables influenced the selection process. I 
hypothesized that among the possible considerations for choosing a US Attorney from a short 
list, having various qualities can have a positive effect on a candidate’s likelihood of being 
chosen as the nominee. By using my original dataset, I was able to test my hypotheses and learn 
about the pool of applicants vying for the coveted title of United States Attorney.    
 
                                                        
1 Eisenstein, James. 1978. Counsel for the United States: U.S. Attorneys in the Political and 
Legal Systems. Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
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Literature Review 
 
 The literature on United States Attorneys all echo one commonality: US Attorneys have 
considerable power over the American justice system and public policy areas. They wield often 
unreviewed discretion in day-to-day decisions, such as which cases to prosecute. The discretion 
they have is immense in comparison to the already broad discretion of other actors in the judicial 
system. This freedom gives them great flexibility in deciding what cases they pursue and the 
sentences that result2. Since their job’s origin in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the power of USAs 
has increased over time, especially given the expansion of federal criminal law. The number of 
USAs has grown with the country they represent, moving from the original thirteen districts to 
ninety-three today. Each is employed by the Department of Justice, known to USAs as “Main 
Justice.”  
 The president nominates the Attorney General and the US Attorney for each district, 
requiring a simple majority confirmation vote in the Senate. The USA hires and fires the 
Assistant US Attorneys in her office and has daily supervision over them3. The Department of 
Justice publishes a manual for USAs that aims to give guidance over policies and procedures. 
This manual is truly guidance, not a rule book. The extent to which federal prosecutors in each 
office follow these guidelines is ultimately decided by the USA in charge of each office (Davis). 
Regardless of the office’s decision to follow the manual, its language permits broad discretion 
                                                        
2 Miller, Banks and Curry, Brett. 2018. U.S. Attorneys, Political Control, and Career Ambition. 
Oxford University Press.  
3 Davis, Angela, 2009. Arbitrary Justice: The Power of the American Prosecutor. New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
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and allows each office to adopt or ignore any policies or procedures within the range of their 
power. Even Assistant US attorneys enjoy this vast and unrestrained prosecutorial power. 
Although state prosecutors have the same type of unrestrained discretion, the decisions made by 
a USA and her office has much greater consequences (Davis).  
 Eisenstein points out that USAs are important figures before they are even officially in 
the job. To be considered, and possibly nominated, they must already be known by an important 
political figure in the district (Eisenstein). Beyond name recognition, they must bring “thorough 
knowledge of the local community and personal contacts with many of [the district’s] political 
and social leaders” (Eisenstein). The subsequently appointed USA then sits in a middle of a 
communication web of federal judges, local political actors, police departments, larger 
bureaucracies such as the FBI, Senators, and the DOJ. Being in the middle of this web of the 
judiciary, elected officials, and bureaucrats puts USAs in a very unique position of influence 
over many arenas in American politics. Because they are appointed by the President himself, 
they have the opportunity to gain considerable exposure in the media. Combining their high 
profile and job power, USAs encounter many opportunities to exert influence beyond their basic 
job duties. Eisenstein calls this the minimum unavoidable impact, describing the inevitability of 
a USA’s decisions affecting policy.  
 According to Eisenstein, there are five policy areas that are impacted by US Attorneys: 
direction and effectiveness of federal law enforcement; the direction and impact of the federal 
civil process; the quality of federal justice; the nature of local law enforcement; and the variety 
of ways they impinge upon aspects of politics beyond the legal process (Eisenstein). These five 
areas fall under the general vicinity of minimum unavoidable impact, as these are impacts that 
arise from day-to-day decisions in USA’s offices. Beyond this, USAs also possess immense 
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knowledge over their districts, and enjoy separation from local politics that state prosecutors do 
not. They can take riskier decisions because of career flexibility and leaving the office, as well as 
taking on controversial and unpopular actions. USAs can utilize the immense resources of the 
DOJ. Studying federal prosecutors is important, as it showcases how the preferences of 
individuals affect “the authoritative allocation of values and resources;” it also shows how the 
agenda setting of US attorneys implicates American feelings about democratic accountability, 
according to Todd Lochner4. This paper will not study the behavior of US Attorneys while they 
are in office, but understanding the importance of their jobs lends credibility to studying who is 
rewarded these vast powers.   
 Holding such important people accountable is difficult, even for the President that 
nominated them. The current constitutional design, case law set by the Supreme Court, and 
failure of the Executive Branch’s mechanisms for checks and balances over the judiciary branch 
have resulted in a lack in accountability of federal prosecutors5.  In addition to the failure of 
these institutional designs, the way federal prosecutors get hired further isolates them from the 
reach of the public. Because appointment is the President’s choice, (pending Senate 
confirmation) there is “very little input by the average citizen, and the public does not learn 
about the practices and policies federal prosecutors plan to implement after appointment” 
                                                        
4 Lochner, Todd. 2002. “Strategic Behavior and Prosecutorial Agenda Setting in the United 
States Attorney’s Offices: The Role of U.S. Attorneys and Their Assistants.” The Justice 
System Journal, Volume 23, Number 3. 
5 Davis, Angela. 2001. “The American Prosecutor: Independence, Power, and the Threat of 
Tyranny,” Iowa Law Review, Volume 86. 
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(Davis). Once in office, the USA appointed by the sitting president knows she can only be 
removed by that president or subsequent ones, but only if people became aware of misconduct 
and demanded her dismissal. She then enjoys the ability to hire her own staff and oversee day-to-
day operations; her boss is the president of the United States, and has far more daily 
responsibilities than just overseeing her conduct in office. Even if there was alleged misconduct, 
the Supreme Court has effectively stopped any type of mechanism for reporting it. The Court has 
protected prosecutorial discretion from legal challenge so much that “its decisions do not deter 
prosecutors from engaging in arguably abusive or inappropriate behavior” (Davis). Prosecutors 
working in a USA’s office can be fired by the USA herself, but she operates with the knowledge 
that only one person can fire her.  
 Understanding who gets this job is arguably the most important aspect of studying the job 
at all. The nomination and confirmation process is arguably the only mechanism of control over 
US Attorneys. The President picks a nominee that he believes will shape policy in line with his 
own beliefs. A typical nominee will have previous service experience as that of a bureaucratic 
nominee, but are subject to the nomination process of a judicial nominee6. They are appointed by 
the President as are executive branch officials, and are subject to the blue slip process similar to 
judicial appointments. This blue slip process refers to the ability of a home state senator’s ability 
to recommend or block positions within their state. Once a vacancy occurs, an interim is 
appointed until the process is complete. The rules of this interim appointment have changed over 
time. After 1986, Congress amended a statute stating that an interim would be appointed by the 
                                                        
6 Nelson, Michael, and Ostrander, Ian, 2016. “Keeping Appointments: The Politics of 
Confirming United States Attorneys”. Justice System Journal, 37:3, 211-231.  
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Attorney General, and if the Senate did not confirm a US attorney within 120 days, the District 
Court would appoint a new interim. If the Senate remains in stalemate, the interim appointed by 
the District Court will remain the US attorney until the next presidential term (Nelson and 
Ostrander).  
 Nelson and Ostrander studied how institutional factors play a role in the nomination 
process, specifically how these factors affect the speed at which a US attorney is confirmed. 
Because US attorneys have high policy relevance but low public salience, Senatorial obstruction 
is common and has little repercussions for the Senator’s consistencies (Nelson and Ostrander). 
The District Courts play a strategic role in nominations as well, because they serve as a reversion 
point once there is no President-Senate bargain struck. The Court might have a preferred 
nominee that is not the presidential-appointed nominee, thus giving the Senate an opportunity to 
use the Court as a reversion point. If the Court and the key Senate actor are ideologically distant, 
the reversion point is considered extreme; the more extreme this point is, the more beneficial 
obstruction becomes to senators (Nelson and Ostrander). Before this occurs, the President has the 
agenda setting power and may pick a nominee that they believe will succeed in the current 
institutional context.  
 Nelson and Ostrander focus their research on the nomination process once a candidate is 
selected by the president and is sent to the Senate for confirmation. Using a survival model, the 
research finds that ideological distance between the District Court and the Senate Judiciary chair 
increase delay, as this scenario creates an incentive for presidents to choose more controversial 
nominees. Distance between the president and the Senate Judiciary chair causes substantial 
increase in delay; however, there is no evidence that distance between the President and the 
District Court affects confirmation timing (Nelson and Ostrander). 
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 Nelson and Ostrander found results that are important to this research, which focuses on 
the pre-nomination period of US attorneys. The blue slip constraint in US attorney nominations 
influences the speed at which a nominee is confirmed. When the president faces moderate 
constraint – one home Senator of his party, and one of the other – the process moves about 15 
days faster. There is no difference in having two Senators of the same party and having two 
Senators of the other party; this suggests that there is more bargaining before the nomination 
when delegations are divided rather when they are united (Nelson and Ostrander). There is also 
evidence that nominees who attended law school in the state for which they are attempting to 
serve are nominated about 16 days faster than their counterparts who went to law school out-of-
state (Nelson and Ostrander).   
 Existing research about US Attorneys and their nomination process focuses on what 
happens once the president formally nominates a candidate, although what occurs before this 
nomination is equally important. Focusing on what Nelson and Ostrander understand about blue 
slip processes, this research builds on how different circumstances in the process of US Attorney 
nomination can shape and influence the eventual confirmed USA. This was done by studying 
short lists. A short list in American politics refers to the list, or group, of potential candidates 
being considered for a nomination. Although no research has been completed on the short lists 
for US Attorneys, it has been completed for federal bureaucrats and Supreme Court justices. 
Both nominated by the President of the United States, this data has predictive power and serves 
as a point of reference for US Attorney short lists and appointment outcomes.  
The process of nominating and confirming a Supreme Court justice is virtually identical 
to the appointment process of US Attorneys. The President makes a recommendation, one of the 
candidates on his short list, that candidate is reviewed by the Senate Judiciary Committee, and 
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sent to the full Senate for consideration. One potential difference is that the president tends to 
keep a running short list of Supreme Court justices, even if there is no vacancy7. For the Justice 
nomination process, the President’s ability to control the nominating environment and likelihood 
of Senate confirmation is greatest at the selection stage. Over time, various presidents have 
fluctuated in how much they consider the opinions of members of Congress before they officially 
nominate someone for consideration (Nemacheck). When there is an open debate on a few 
candidates, rather than just one, the president still holds some power in his hands. According to 
Nemacheck, “a president’s decision to relinquish some control over the development of the short 
list may well be strategic.”  
 Nemacheck finds that for Supreme Court Justices, Presidents act strategically in listening 
to and incorporating Senator’s suggestions and endorsements. This is more evident under various 
institutional constraints such as his party being the minority in the Senate, or his political capital, 
such as popularity. With less constraints, he controls the process with a narrower scope; under 
these constraints, Nemacheck finds the president to act strategically. Nemacheck defines this 
strategic behavior as allowing more voices to influence those on a short list, and who is chosen 
from that list. Those with a powerful voice (such as having a leadership position in the Senate) 
are heard more.  
 The appointment process of Justices is functionally identical to that of US Attorneys. 
Another appointment process dominated by the president is that of federal agency leadership 
positions. This process is different because there is great variation in how many appointees’ 
                                                        
7 Nemacheck, Christine. 2007. Strategic Selection: Presidential Nomination of Supreme Court 
Justices from Herbert Hoover through George W. Bush. University of Virginia Press. 
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various agencies have. Over time, the majority of federal agencies in the United States have been 
“politicized,” meaning they have the largest percentage and deepest penetration of appointees8. 
The number of political appointments the President of the United States makes for federal 
agencies in the first days in office is far greater than any other government in the world. There 
are many types of federal appointees, but for the sake of comparing this process to US Attorneys, 
we will focus on the other jobs referred to as PAS: President appointed and Senate confirmed.  
 The people chosen for these positions are those who “have the greatest chance of 
accomplishing what the principal wants done,” (Lewis) the principal being the President9. This is 
one of the first tasks when a president is elected into office. In the modern era, many 
administrations have employed professional recruiters to identify qualified individuals for 
positions at the top of each agency. The first short lists compiled are those jobs that are important 
for public safety and those important to advancing the President’s agenda. These Executive 
Branch positions have direct control over policy, possibly even more so than judges or US 
Attorneys. The motive behind picking the right candidate for these positions is getting control of 
policy, and deciding who will be most loyal to the president while also being qualified (Lewis). 
Terry Moe argues that presidents are held accountable for the performance of the whole 
government, therefore are more concerned with having a staff that responds to his political needs 
                                                        
8 Lewis, David, 2008. The Politics of Presidential Appointments: Political Control and 
Bureaucratic Performance. Princeton University Press. 
9 Note: the data and literature on the PAS appointees Lewis discusses excludes US Attorneys. 
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rather than effectiveness10. This has led to increased politicization among bureaucratic 
appointments.  
 One marked difference between the appointment of US Attorneys and agency appointees 
is that Congress controls the number and location of agency appointees, while the number of US 
Attorneys remain fixed. Regardless of being Senate approved or not, while appointing agency 
positions, the president always has an eye toward Congress’s response. If there is policy 
preference divergence between Congress and the president, the president may increase the 
number of appointees to pull the respective agency’s policy away from what a member of 
Congress prefers (Lewis). Furthermore, the preferred number of appointees from a member of 
Congress’s standpoint will change based on their ideology relative to the president and the 
agency: the more policy divergence, the less Congress wants to politicize. Lewis also finds that 
patronage appointees (those applicants connected to the campaign, have party or interest group 
ties, etc.) are likely to increase in agencies whose policy views are similar to the president. These 
patronage appointees are more likely to be Schedule C positions, as these are the least visible to 
Congress and easiest to create. Senate-confirmed appointees (PAS) are the most visible to 
Congress and hardest for the president to change once confirmed, but have the largest control on 
policy.  
 Unlike federal agencies that are fluid in the amount of politicization that may occur, the 
President cannot change policy outcomes of the Department of Justice by the nature of its 
organizational structure and appointment system. The number of US Attorneys is fixed, and after 
                                                        
10 Moe, Terry, and Howell, William, 2009. “Unilateral Action and Presidential Power: A 
Theory”. Presidential Studies Quarterly 29.  
 Parker 13 
removing USAs from the count, there are only about 36 PAS appointees for Justice. Lewis 
argues that Congress can shift policy of various agencies by increasing or decreasing the number 
of appointees granted, as can the president (assuming Congressional approval). This is not true 
for Justice’s most important actors, US Attorneys, which is why studying who is chosen for the 
job, rather than how many, is the best way to understand how the president and Congress 
influence the outcomes of the DOJ. However, Lewis’s work serves as an important resource for 
understanding policy versus patronage reasons behind a president’s choice; this research will 
explore the relevance of these motivations behind contenders for US attorney positions.  
 The literature on US Attorneys and other presidential appointees demonstrate what is 
considered by the President, Senators, and others aiding the nomination process. The literature 
made suggestions about the importance of law school education, previous employment, policy 
preferences, and racial and gender demographics when deciding between candidates. This 
research aims to uncover what the nomination process is for US Attorneys, of which there is no 
data on their short lists. I collected and analyzed a sample of US Attorney short lists to predict 
what considerations and characteristics are the most important while picking the next US 
Attorney.  
 
Hypotheses 
Legal Education  
In any political appointment for positions that serve at the state level, it is an advantage to 
be from that state, as it increases the likelihood for name recognition and more connections. A lot 
of lawyers tend to work in the state they attended law school in, as the school will also have job 
connections. This is true for lawyers working in the public sector just as much as those working 
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in the private sector; Eisenstein points out that US Attorneys must “thorough knowledge of the 
local community and personal contacts with many of [the district’s] political and social leaders” 
(Eisenstein). Attending law school in the state for which a candidate is seeking a US Attorney 
spot is a strong measure of demonstrated commitment to and knowledge of that state. 
Furthermore, Nelson and Ostrander find that nominees who attend law school in-state enjoy a 
faster confirmation process, thus noting the importance of where a nominee’s legal education 
took place.  
H1: Attending law school in a candidate’s home state will be a positive predictor of their 
likelihood of being nominated as US Attorney.  
 A law school’s ranking has long been deemed a measure of their graduate’s intellectual 
and professional capabilities. If a lawyer attended a “top-14” ranked law school, most assume 
they are smart and hard-working to have graduated from a top school. Those who are considered 
for a US Attorney role must demonstrate a deep understanding of the legal profession and the 
abilities of a strong lawyer. Attending a top school is an indication of ability for most lawyers, 
and is no different for those competing for a US Attorney spot. Not only is attending a top school 
an indication for those on a short list, but I expect it to be an unwritten prerequisite.  
H2: Attending a top-14 ranked law school increases a candidate’s likelihood of becoming US 
Attorney.  
 
Previous Employment 
Those who are interested in serving in a public sector position, such as in a US 
Attorney’s office, tend to have already worked in the public sector versus private. Working in the 
public sector is especially helpful if one’s eventual career aspiration is an important position such 
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as US Attorney; it demonstrates dedication to local and state governments, and more broadly, 
dedication to well-being and justice in their community. Furthermore, public service work in the 
legal profession means public record of a candidate’s job performance, which could be an 
indication of their policy preferences. Having a candidate’s policy preference align with his own 
is important to the President in a highly salient position such as US Attorney.   
H3: Working in the public sector at the time of consideration will be a positive predictor of being 
chosen as US Attorney.  
 Even if a candidate is working in the private sector at the time of consideration for the US 
Attorney post, having previous work experience in the public sector will still benefit them.  
H4: Having experience working in the public sector will increase a candidate’s likelihood of 
being chosen.  
From the existing literature, Lochner found that average tenure has increased among 
Assistant US Attorneys since the 1990s. This longer tenure allows AUSAs to gain more 
experience in the office and make personal connections that would benefit them in attempting to 
get a promotion.  
H5: Since the 1990s, there will be an increasing number of Assistant US Attorneys 
considered for US Attorney.  
Furthermore, when a vacancy occurs, an AUSA could be an ideal candidate, as they 
would possess name recognition, know a considerable amount about the job, and have had the 
opportunity to demonstrate their potential while working under a USA. As AUSAs have become 
more professionalized, their rising status in US Attorney offices will be rewarded by being 
considered for a promotion when a US Attorney vacancy occurs.  
H5: Being an Assistant US Attorney will be a positive predictor in being chosen as US Attorney.  
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Personal Characteristics 
In addition to resume characteristics, candidates should be recognized by their gender, 
race, and other personal characteristics that separate themselves from “the pack.” Many 
candidates may be recognized for their leadership as a female or racial minority, in a career field 
often dominated by older white men. As female representation in the legal profession has 
steadily increased since the 1980s,11 female representation among US Attorneys should increase 
accordingly, as there are more qualified female candidates. Being a woman will subsequently be 
a benefit to this candidate, as her nomination can be used as a sign of the President’s and 
Senators commitment to gender diversity in the legal profession.  
H6: Over time, there will be more female candidates in the pool of applicants.  
H7: Being a female candidate increases the likelihood they are chosen.   
Furthermore, both leaders in the legal community and Presidents of the United States 
have weighed in on the lack of diversity among American lawyers. In 1999, the former President 
of the American Bar Association was not afraid to point out the lack of minority representation 
among the legal profession: 30% of the nation’s population were members of racial or ethnic 
minorities, but only 8% of lawyers were minorities12. Presidents Kennedy and Clinton made 
similar claims to point out this lack of diversity, and summoned changes to prevent racism and 
increase diversity. In 1999, President Clinton created an Advisory Committee to help “minorities 
share in modern American prosperity and urged the legal profession to take steps to diversify the 
                                                        
11 Carson, C, 2004. The Lawyer Statistical Report: The U.S. Legal Profession in 2000. Chicago: 
American Bar Association.  
12 New ABA Head Decries Lack Of Diversity, 222 N.Y. L.J., Aug. 11, 1999.  
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profession13”. After the lack of diversity among lawyers became a known public issue, 
Presidents in charge of US Attorney nominations found an opportunity to demonstrate their 
genuine or forged commitment to diversity for a favorable public outcome, or to increase 
descriptive representation.  
H8: Over time, there will be more racial minorities in the pool of applicants.  
H9: Being a racial minority increases the likelihood they are chosen.  
Design  
Data 
  Until the dataset for this research was collected, there had been no data on US Attorney 
short lists. While research on US Attorneys exists, it is only of those who are already selected to 
the position. Thus, I had to collect every piece of information that makes up this dataset. To 
complete the research, new methods had to be discovered for finding out what type of candidates 
make up the applicant pool of US Attorneys. The research depended completely on short lists 
availability to the public.  Luckily, local news sources found US Attorney short lists important 
enough to report on, and provided enough preliminary information to compile this short list data. 
Newspaper articles provided the names on a short list, and generally included information about 
their current employment and previous employment. While some parts were found in the original 
article, I had to use additional sources to find the remaining parts. What was of interest to me 
                                                        
13 Malpica, William and España, Mauricio, 2003. “Expanding Latino Participiation in the Legal 
Profession” Strategies for Increasing Latino Law School Enrollments”. Fordham Urban 
Law Journal, Volume 3, Number 4.  
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was applicant pool names, current and previous employment, law school attended, gender, and 
race.  
Due to time constraints, I was not able to collect research on every judicial district in the 
United States; I decided to collect a random sample of 10 judicial districts. Of the 93 judicial 
districts that make up the US, the districts were categorized and separated by the number of cases 
the district saw each year, thus separating the smallest from the largest districts by case volume. 
Five levels of activity were created, and two districts from each of these groups were randomly 
selected to be studied. The sample includes Texas West; Oregon; Tennessee East; Alabama 
North; Montana; Massachusetts; Wisconsin East; Delaware; Maine; and California. While only 
the central district of California was randomly selected, I decided to include all of California in 
my dataset. I did so because California encompasses districts with varying levels of judicial 
activity and thus provides opportunity for a wide range of data points. Overall, I believe this 
sample to be a good measure of the bigger population of districts that make up the country; they 
represent different geographic location and case volume, and had data going back to President 
George H.W. Bush’s time in office.  
One setback the sample had was the lack of news articles, thus lack of data, in three of 
the districts. These were Tennessee East, Alabama North, and Texas West. I concluded that this 
data did not exist within public knowledge, or in some vacancies, there was only one candidate 
being considered. However, I was able to find ample data on each of the other districts in my 
sample, still providing a rich dataset to perform my analysis.  
The first step in my data collection process was locating an article discussing a particular 
vacancy’s short list, finding these in an online database. After a substantial amount of trial and 
error in determining the right search method to use in large databases such as ProQuest and 
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LexisNexis, I was able to create a system that worked. The system that I used was narrowing the 
publication date to one year before and one year after a US Attorney nomination, and searching 
the eventual nominee’s name with the current President’s name. This generally worked, and if no 
relevant results appeared, I would use each Senator’s name instead of the President, or use 
another database.  
Once I found an article that provided short list information, I would record their name 
and any information the article provided about the candidate, such as employment.  Next, I 
would use their name to find information about where they went to law school, previous places 
of employment, and race. This information was readily available in online biographies on their 
employer’s webpage, news articles about promotions to judgeships or faculty at law schools, or 
even obituaries in some cases.  Once the information was collected on one short list, I would 
move to the next. Before coding variables, a short list in my dataset would look as so: 
Table 1. California Central Judicial District Short List, 1993 
Name Employment Law School 
Lourdes G Baird* 
 
LA Municipal Court Judge; LA 
Superior Court Judge 
UCLA 
 
Donald C. Smaltz AUSA; private firm Penn State 
 
Alexander Williams III 
 
Headed narcotics unit for USA's office; 
Justice Department's Narcotics and 
Dangerous Drug section; Chief 
Assistant to USA; judge on Superior 
Court 
 
UVA 
 
Terry Bird 
 
AUSA overseeing a task force that 
prosecuted fraud and corruption in 
federal housing programs; Partner at 
private firm 
 
UCLA 
 
  *Was eventually nominated to US Attorney.  
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 Compiled and organized in one sheet, I was able to use this information to code for 
variables and analyze the data.  
Comparing employment histories of various shortlists across time and space represent a 
lot of the knowledge I have about US Attorney applicant pools. While law school, gender, and 
race are important, most illuminating in studying US Attorney short lists is the amount high-
achieving and “top” public and private sector jobs candidates held. If they are coming from the 
private sector, they are partners at law firms. If they are coming from the public sector, they are 
chairs of committees and associations, legal advisors to top politicians, district attorneys, or even 
state representatives. A 1993 Los Angeles Times article is a good example:  
Chief assistant U.S. attorney for three years, now a partner in Los 
Angeles office of Skadden… Los Angeles County Superior Court 
judge…. Chief counsel to the California Department of 
Transportation… partner in Talcott, Lightfoot, Vandevelde, 
Woehrle & Sadowsky… chief of the criminal division of the Los 
Angeles city attorney’s office14…  
 
These qualifications describe some of the lawyers being considered for a USA post in 
Los Angeles, a highly active judicial district. Even in a smaller district, the same type of 
coverage was expected:  
Andrea Gargiulo, the former head of Boston's Licensing Board and 
one-time assistant district attorney in Middlesex County has 
applied, as have Boston attorneys Rikki J. Klieman, a former clerk 
for US District Judge Walter Jay Skinner and a former assistant 
district attorney, and Alice Richmond, a former head of the 
Massachusetts Bar Association, sources said15. 
 
 While the results of this paper provide a solid base in learning about US Attorney short 
lists, the prestige and success of each candidate was not as easily translated to coded variables. I 
                                                        
14 Weinstein, Henry. 1993. “10 Lawyers Vie for Powerful U.S. Atty. Job.” Los Angeles Times.  
15 Brelis, Matthew. 1993. “US Attorney hopefuls make a varied field.” Boston Globe.  
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provide this sample short list and segments of articles to stress the importance of considering 
how equally impressive candidates eventually win the nomination. In simple terms, every short 
list candidate in my research is hard-working and successful: how does one stand out from the 
others?  
 
Dependent Variable 
My dependent variable was a candidate being selected as US Attorney from their short list.  
 
Independent Variables 
In-State Law School. I measure those who attended a law school in-state versus those who took 
their legal education out-of-state. Because all candidates work in the state they are being 
considered to represent at US Attorney, attending a law school in that state can be a more 
accurate measure of “home state advantage.”  
Law School Rank. I coded whether a candidate attended a top-14 ranked law school, which 
measures the prestige of their legal education.   
Public Sector Job. I coded whether or not a candidate was working in the public sector at the 
time of consideration.  
Public Sector Experience. I coded whether a candidate had any experience working in the public 
sector, at any point in their legal career. 
Assistant US Attorneys. This variable measures Lochner’s idea that AUSAs have been increasing 
their tenure since the 1990s, thus increasing their ability to rise to the role of US Attorney.  
Gender. To measure if gender plays a role in the comparison of candidates across short lists, 
female candidates were coded differently than male candidates.   
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Race. To determine the importance of representing a racial minority on a short list, minorities 
were coded differently than Caucasian candidates.   
 
 After coding each variable, I was able to find averages of a variable across the whole 
dataset, compare averages of different regions and time frames, and perform a regression model 
using each variable. In each of my tables, I compared independent variable mean among those 
who were selected as US Attorney and those who were not. I did so to emphasize the 
comparison, and any significant differences, between the chosen nominee and his peers on a 
short list. To provide a baseline average across all short lists, I found the mean of each 
independent variable across my whole dataset. Although I did not make predictions about 
differences across regions or time, I separated the districts by these measures to see if there were 
any interesting differences, or anomalies that could explain unexpected results. I did this for all 
of my hypotheses except H5, which expects being an Assistant US Attorney as a positive 
predictor. I decided to focus on separating the results by more time periods, rather than by 
region, because my motivation for studying this variable was assessing the literature’s claims 
that AUSAs have professionalized over time. Lastly, I compiled each independent variable’s 
regression model.  
 
Results 
 
The results of this data analysis include results on data averages and probability models 
that shed some light on the process of appointing US Attorneys. While some models yielded less 
than significant results, the insignificance of these results is equally informative about the 
nomination process. Table 1 provides variable averages for US Attorney eventual nominees and 
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the other candidates. Each overall average is listed first, and subsequent categories separate 
results by region and time.  
Table 2. Legal education  
 Actual Nominee 
(n=39) 
Potential Nominee 
(n=97) 
Home State Advantage 
Attended Law School In-State 
 
0.500 
 
0.633 
Northeast 0.571 0.793 
Midwest 0.667 0.824 
West 0.458 0.455 
Pre 2000 0.600 0.724 
Post 2000 0.421 0.590 
Law School Selectivity 
Attended a top-14 ranked law 
school 
 
 
0.470 
 
 
0.458 
North 0.286 0.429 
Midwest 0.333 0.176 
West 0.542 0.591 
Pre 2000 0.533 0.486 
Post 2000 0.421 0.443 
 
 None of the results from this analysis are particularly striking. Somewhat surprisingly, of 
those selected for US Attorney (and were confirmed by the Senate), exactly half attended a law 
school in their home state. It was expected that the majority of those chosen for US Attorney 
would attend law school in the state they were later chosen to represent. This result is also 
surprising when compared to the pool of applicants they were competing against, with about 
63% home-state representation. In the regions studied from the United States Northeast and 
Midwest, the competitors to the chosen US Attorney represent a fairly larger portion of home-
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state JD recipients than their counterparts. In the Western districts, the law school representation 
is much more evenly distributed. Additionally, the Northern and Midwestern districts 
demonstrate a larger commitment to home-state law school goers. Time also shows a lessening 
commitment overall to home-staters. Although these results are slightly contrary to what was 
predicted, further analysis of this variable’s predictive power of US Attorney selection can 
provide explanations.  
 Attending a top law school was another expected trend across short lists. The data shows 
that nearly half of all candidates went to a top-14 law school. The West Coast districts represent 
more top-14 law school attendance than the other regions. Additionally, after 2000, attending a 
top school was less common than the previous 13 years the data represents. This result is 
interesting to consider with the fact that both US Attorneys and peers on a short list represent 
less in-state legal education after 2000. Considered together, these could indicate the weak 
predictive power of selection a candidate’s legal education has. There is no trend across regions, 
as each region differs in having more or less of the potential versus actual nominee attending a 
top school. This is also true when comparing the two different time periods. Thus, the attendance 
of a top-ranked law school appears to have less predictive power over being selected as US 
Attorney as I had hypothesized.  
 Looking at the data results regarding public sector experience demonstrate the seemingly 
strong effect of working in the public sector as an advantage in a USA short list pool.  
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Table 3. Public Sector Experience 
 Actual Nominee 
(n=39) 
Potential Nominee 
(n=97) 
Worked in Public Sector at time of 
consideration 
 
0.824 
 
0.733 
North 1.00 0.724 
Midwest 1.00 0.882 
West 0.75 0.682 
Pre 2000 0.933 0.690 
Post 2000 0.737 0.754 
Has work experience in public 
sector 
 
0.882 
 
 
0.865 
North 1.00 0.886 
Midwest 1.00 0.882 
West 0.833 0.841 
Pre 2000 0.933 0.914 
Post 2000 0.842 0.836 
 
Although in line with the prediction, these results may be the result of self-selection; it is 
fairly unlikely to be considered for a highly salient public service position when you work in the 
private sector, or have no public sector experience. Unless a candidate worked in the public 
sector previously or knows people in high places, they most likely will have no name recognition 
among Senators and the President, or even have any desire to be a US Attorney. However, what 
is telling about these results is the fact that not one single US Attorney in the Northern and 
Midwestern districts in this dataset came from the private sector directly. Although they do 
represent some of the potential nominee pool, they were not chosen. This result must be 
quantified by the fact that the dataset is not fully comprehensive across all districts and all time. 
However, it does suggest a bias against private sector lawyers who are in the initial pool of 
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applicants. There also seems to be a decline in the number of public sector attorneys after the 
year 2000, suggesting this bias has slightly decreased over time. Across all regional and time 
groups, the actual nominees represent more public sector employment at the time of 
consideration than their potential peers. This evidence supports my hypothesis that more US 
Attorneys will have worked in the public sector at the nomination process, and that it is a 
positive predictor of being chosen as US Attorney.  
Reviewing the results of candidates who worked in the public sector at any time prior to 
consideration demonstrate this common characteristic across short lists. Large percentages of 
both actual and potential nominees had public sector experience at some point in their careers; a 
comparison between chosen and potential nominees does not see significant differences. These 
results do not provide strong evidence for my hypothesis regarding the effect of public sector 
work on a candidate’s likelihood for nomination, because the vast majority of candidates have 
public sector experience. With about 88% of all candidates having public sector experience at 
some point in their careers, it becomes the norm to have such experience. The opposite of my 
hypothesis might be plausible, meaning not having any public sector experience would be a 
negative predictor of being selected as US Attorney.  
 Another result of importance is the occurrence of increasing (or decreasing) numbers of 
Assistant US Attorneys rising to the US Attorney role. Lochner suggested increasing AUSA 
tenure since the 1990s, and this data can provide a small window in determining how this 
affected in-office promotions in USA offices.  
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Table 4. Assistant US Attorneys and Short Lists  
 
   
 
 
 
  
 
 
 Table 4 demonstrates two figures, one being average presence of Assistant US Attorneys 
on Short Lists, and the average selection of an AUSA to the post. Overall, only about 18% of the 
compiled candidates were AUSAs at the time of consideration. This is a fairly low number, 
considering their proximity to the job opening. However, as Lochner states, AUSAs only 
recently began staying in their offices for longer than a year or two, making the expertise of these 
figures relatively new. Lochner suggested this change in an AUSA’s career aspirations to be 
around 1995, which is the reason for separating these results by year, and taking special note of 
changes after the year 1995. The results found from this notably small sample demonstrate that 
the literature may be correct, but changes were not seen until well after the new century began. 
While less AUSAs were considered post-1995 than pre-1995, the data does suggest more AUSA 
consideration after 2005: with 22% of the latter decade’s short lists being AUSAs, versus about 
12% from 1987 through 2005. While this increase is not particularly large, it’s existence in the 
data is worth noting.  
 Presence on Short 
Lists (mean) 
Selection for US 
Attorney (mean) 
Increasing in-office 
promotions 
 
0.182 
 
 
0.455 
1987-1995 0.195 0.50 
1996-2005 0.125 0.60 
2006-2015 0.222 0.333 
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 Of the AUSAs being considered, nearly half were chosen to fill their former bosses’ job, 
as demonstrated by the second set of results in Table 4. Across all years for which data was 
collected, 45% of the AUSAs were subsequently chosen for US Attorney. Prior to 1995, 50% 
were hired, representing a figure close to the overall average. Comparing these averages before 
and after 2005 is both interesting and surprising, as 60% represent the former average and 33% 
for the latter. While post-2005 saw an increase in AUSAs considered, the year also marked a 
decrease in AUSAs actually chosen.  
Table 5. Gender and Race 
 Actual Nominee 
(n=39) 
All Nominees (Actual 
& Potential n=136) 
 
Female Representation 
 
0.265 0.221 
Northeast 0.143 0.262 
Midwest 0.00 0.25 
West 0.333 0.188 
Pre 2000 0.133 0.20 
Post 2000 0.368 0.235 
Minority Representation 0.176 0.084 
Northeast 0.143 0.095 
Midwest 0.00 0.00 
West 0.208 0.101 
Pre 2000 0.133 0.06 
Post 2000 0.211 0.099 
  
Perhaps the most striking evidence of female and minority representation on US Attorney 
shortlists is the lack thereof. A quarter of US Attorneys, in the selected districts, were women. 
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Grouped by region, the results show more female attorneys as contenders than actual nominees. 
The Northeast had twice as many women on short lists than they did female US Attorneys. The 
Midwestern district saw no female US Attorneys in the sample districts and years. The West 
Coast districts, however, have women representing about one third of their US Attorneys, even 
though about 18% make up their short lists. This suggests that female candidates stand out in 
these districts, as they represent a fair margin at the US Attorney post, but make up far less than 
a third of the short lists. In terms of female representation over time, the evidence supports that 
more there have been more and more female US Attorneys, especially after 2000. However, 
when looking at female representation on short lists, the results do not support my hypothesis 
regarding more female representation on short lists. Before and after 2000, a comparable 
percentage of women were on US Attorney short lists, which does not lend my expectation much 
credibility.  
 Similarly, minorities do not represent any significant portion of US Attorney posts and 
short lists. Trends between regions and time are similar to the trends seen in female 
representation. However, although only 17% of US Attorneys I researched were minorities, only 
8% of short lists were made up of minorities. A figure not noted in this table is the fact that of all 
the minorities in this dataset, across all time and districts, 60% were selected as a US Attorney, 
which is the group that makes up the 17% seen in Table 5. Although this statistic from this 
sample might not be transferable to the larger population of US Attorneys, it is hopeful evidence 
of increasing minority representation among USAs. There is a small increase in percentage of 
minorities on short lists, giving a small amount of support for my expectation of this figure 
increasing.  
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 These results demonstrate the demographics of the short lists collected, but what is of 
greater importance is the measured effect each variable has on the possibility of a candidate 
rising to the job.  
 
Table 6. Regression Model 
Various Effects on Selection Probability  Coefficient Std. Error 
Legal Education 
Attending in-state law school 
 
-0.11027 
 
0.08173 
Attending top-14 law school 0.009524 0.077915 
Previous Employment 
Working in public sector at time of 
consideration 
 
0.09787 
 
0.09389 
 
Work experience in public sector  
 
Being AUSA 
 
0.03019 
 
0.23232* 
 
0.11518 
 
0.10384 
Personal Characteristics  
Female Candidates 
 
0.07633 
 
0.09425 
Racial Minority 0.37341* 0.14213 
     *p < .05 (one tail test) 
 
 
 The various predicted effects on likelihood of selection did not perform particularly well 
in the regression model. The only variables that demonstrate being an Assistant US Attorney, or 
being a minority, and both show movement in the expected direction. These results support my 
hypotheses that being an Assistant US Attorney is a positive predictor of being chosen as US 
Attorney, as is being a minority. The regression demonstrated being an AUSA as a positive 
predictor, which was the expected direction. This is not surprising given the known increase in 
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tenure and professionalization among Assistant US Attorneys. Demonstrating comparable 
credentials to other short list candidates, taking an AUSA job and remaining in the job proved to 
be beneficial in getting promoted. The evidence I collected for this from my own research 
compliments existing literature about the new job prospects created by increasing AUSA tenure.   
The evidence of race as a predictor of nomination likelihood is strengthened by the large 
amount of minority candidates who were successful in being nominated. Perhaps they were 
chosen because the nominating President or Senators wanted positive recognition for choosing 
the first minority US Attorney of a given district. Perhaps they were the favorite candidate to 
begin with. Regardless of this information, the results signify positive news for minority 
representation in the highest ranks of the legal profession.  
While disappointing that the other independent variables have significant effect, the lack 
of effect is a crucial result. This data suggests a lack of effect on selection of a US Attorney 
candidate by these variables alone, suggesting other political and strategic mechanisms are at 
work. Analyzing the variables alone do not account for a candidate’s alignment with the 
President’s policy preferences; personal relationships between a candidate and the President or 
Senators; or a candidate’s long-time shown commitment to the community in which they work. 
These subjective characteristics appear to be what sets a chosen candidate apart from his peers 
on a short list.  
 
Discussion 
 I decided to conduct this research because I saw a gap in the knowledge about a powerful 
and important figure in the United States justice system. US Attorneys are the gatekeepers to 
decisions about justice, law, and order, in the US. They are not elected by the public, yet enjoy 
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almost unmatched discretion once in office, which makes the person who has this job very 
important. Because there was no baseline knowledge about US Attorney short lists until this data 
was collected, I decided to look at how basic qualifications such as education, career, gender, 
and race played a role in who was chosen as US Attorney. My results showed that only two 
independent variables showed support for my hypotheses in the regression model, being an 
Assistant US Attorney and being a minority.  
 In light of recent literature and current political knowledge, it is not surprising that these 
two variables moved in the expected direction. If an Assistant US Attorney performed well in the 
job, and had enough tenure in the office to demonstrate enough experience, there are little 
reasons why they would not be chosen for a promotion. Working directly under a US Attorney 
allows for more knowledge of and exposure to the policy goals of the current US Attorney, 
which most likely match the policy goals of the current administration. These federal prosecutors 
also have autonomy and their own level of discretion, thus an opportunity to display their own 
policy agenda, and often handle high-profile cases. The combination of these factors puts federal 
prosecutors into a group of special consideration when a US Attorney vacancy occurs, more so 
than other high-profile public attorneys, such as a District Attorney.  
 Race is a similarly unsurprising motivation behind choosing the next US Attorney. 
Presidents have expressed their own personal commitments to diversifying the legal profession 
to create more equality, combat racism, and increase descriptive representation among lawyers. 
Nominating a well-qualified minority US Attorney is a means to do so, as it will be public 
knowledge that a minority US Attorney was hand-picked by the President. Whether the 
President, or Senators, had a genuine interest in increasing diversity in the legal profession or 
were merely interested in boosting public ratings and election favorability, it is still good news 
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for minorities. A strong performance in office will hopefully help break down racial stereotypes 
and pave the way for more diversity in the profession. It is not wholly unsurprising that race had 
a stronger benefit to candidates than gender did; although women have also faced their own 
struggles in the legal profession, minorities face a more difficult uphill battle than women. While 
sexism still exists, racism in America is systemic and is not going away any time soon.   
Although having predictions about the effect each variable would have on nomination 
likelihood, I know the considerations for a highly salient post are strategic, political, and 
sometimes arbitrary. The applicability of the principal-agent theory to American politics is 
enough to know that a candidate is selected for reasons other than legal education, previous 
employment, and other measures of job ability. Presidents, Senators, and any on a nominating 
committee knows that US Attorneys are wildly powerful and unchecked once they are put in 
office, which is why picking the right candidate is imperative. The literature suggests that a 
President may focus on picking a candidate that the Senate favors, and has a good chance at 
passing Senate confirmation; other literature suggests a President will pick a candidate who will 
best achieve his policy goals, regardless of how effective this candidate might be as an agent. 
Every political appointment is complicated and includes private negotiations that researchers will 
never know about. 
This research covers the demographics and characteristics of US Attorney applicant 
pools, from a fairly representative sample. Although I did not uncover what the “ideal” US 
Attorney hopeful resembles, we know more now than before. The potential considerations of a 
President while picking a US Attorney is shorter by demonstrating evidence that some 
characteristics, such as those regarding legal education and previous employment, do not predict 
much about which candidate is selected. Thus, we are closer to determining what does incur 
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favorability in selection by knowing what does not. Future research can review factors such as 
policy motivations, confirmation motivations, and others.  
 
Conclusion  
 In nomination processes, and in American politics as a whole, there is never an easy 
answer or one factor that can predict such complicated processes. It is a combination of many 
factors, political considerations, and often, behind the scenes deal making. From this research, 
we learn about US Attorney applicant’s legal education, previous employment, and other 
descriptive characteristics. We also know how these variables may or may not be important at all 
when comparing candidates. Of the variables I studied, being an Assistant US Attorney and 
being a minority demonstrated positive predictive power of selection. The results also 
demonstrated general homogeny in the characteristics of candidate’s legal educations and 
previous work experience. Coming from equally impressive backgrounds, the research 
demonstrates that the appointment process of US Attorneys is concerned with bigger picture 
outcomes, such as policy and agenda setting once in office.  
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Appendix  
Short Lists for US Attorney Nominations 
TXW; OR; TNE; ALN; MT; MA; WIE; DE; ME; CA. 1987-2015.  
George W. Bush 
MA Wayne A Budd Former President of MA Bar Assoc Wayne State U 
MA David Locke MA House Rep, Senate Harvard 
MA Argeo Paul Cellucci Chairman of Bush's personnel 
advisory committee 
Boston College 
MA Thomas Trimarco Mass Secretary of Admin and Finance Boston College 
MA Leon J Lombardi cochair of Bush's 1980 campaign in 
MA, chair of MA GOP, memberof 
MA House 
BU 
MA William Sawyer Private firm Harvard 
MA Terence McGinnis Bank of Boston VP Boston College 
MA Dan Winslow GOP legal advisor Boston College 
MA Joyce Hampers State revenue commissioner                     Boston College 
MT Doris Poppler County Attorney                                       U of Montana 
CAC Lourdes G Baird LA Municipal Court Judge; LA 
Superior Court Judge 
UCLA 
CAC Donald C. Smaltz AUSA, then trial lawyer at private 
firm 
Penn State 
CAC Alexander Williams III Headed narcotics unit for USA's 
office, then Justice Department's 
narcotics and dangerous drug section, 
then chief assistant to USA, then judge 
on Superior Court 
UVA 
CAC Terry Bird AUSA overseeing a task force that 
prosecuted fraud and corruption in 
federal housing programs, then partner 
at private firm 
UCLA 
CAE George L OConnell Private Harvard 
CAS William Braniff interim USA/AUSA in another state Rutgers 
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Bill Clinton 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MA Donald Kenneth 
Stern 
Chair of the US Attorney General's Advisory Committee, 
chieg legal counsel to Gov Dukakis, assistant attorney 
general in MA 
Georgetown 
MA Eleanor Acheson Partner at Ropes & Gray                                                          BC 
MA Alice Richmond Head of MA Bar Association                                                   Harvard 
MA James Shannon Attorney General                                                                                                                         GW
MA Andrea Gargiulo District Attorney                                                                          Suffolk 
MA Rikki Klieman District Attorney    BU 
MA Deval L Patrick Partner at Hill & Barlow/ MA governor Harvard 
MA Alan D. Rose Partner at Nutter, McLennen and Fish UVA 
MT Sherry Matteucci Assistant District Attorney U of 
Montana 
WIE Thomas Paul 
Schneider 
Assistant Deputy Attorney Wisconsin 
WIE Peg 
Lautenschlager 
DA Winnebago county, WI State assembly *became 
USA for WIW in 1993* 
wisconsin 
WIE Mark E 
Sostarich 
Milwaukee atty private wisconsin 
WIE Patricia Gorence WI's deputy AG Marquette 
DE Gregory Moneta Sleet Rutgers 
DE Carl Schnee 
 
Villanova 
ME Jay Patrick 
McCloskey 
AUSA Maine 
CAC Nora Margaret 
Manella 
LA Municipal Court; LA Superior Court; Legal Counsel 
to US Senate Judiciary Committee 
USC 
CAC Terree A Bowers US attorney (interim) Texas 
CAC Richard E 
Drooyan 
Federal Prosecutor, Partner at Skadden Harvard 
CAC Dana S Henry Superior Court Judge U of San 
Diego 
CAC Thomas . E 
Holliday 
White Collar Criminal Defense Specialist USC 
CAC Michael J 
Lightfoot 
Federal prosecutor, now partner at firm UVA 
CAC Nora Manella fed prosecutor, chief of USAs office criminal appeals 
unit 
USC 
CAC Burt Pines Federal prosecutor, now partner at firm NYU 
CAC Brian Sun Federal prosecutor, now partner at firm USC 
CAC Alejandro N 
Mayorkas 
AUSA Loyola 
CAC Richad Drooyan Second in command at prosecutors office - boss of ANM 
(chief assistant US attorney) 
Harvard 
CAE Charles Joseph 
Stevens 
AUSA Berkeley 
CAE Paul L Seave Picked as interim and subsequently nominated Penn 
CAN Michael Joseph 
Yamaguchi 
Tax lawyer USF 
CAN Robert S Mueller 
III 
Interim USA UVA 
CAS Alan D Bersin AUSA Yale 
CAS James W 
Brannigan JR 
US attorney (temp after Braniff) USD 
CAS Gregory Vega AUSA Valparaiso 
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 George W. Bush 
OR Michael W 
Mosman 
Private J. Reuben Clark 
Law School 
OR Karin Immergut Multnomah County Deputy District attorney Berkeley 
OR Kevin Mannix workers comp attorney UVA 
OR Rob partridge State rep Willamette 
OR Kevin Mannix workers comp attorney UVA 
OR Karin J 
Immergut 
Dep. Chief of narcotics section Berkeley 
MA Michael J 
Sullivan 
district attorney for Plymouth County  Suffolk 
MA Ralph C Martin 
II 
Suffolk county DA Northeastern 
MA Jeffrey Locke Dept of Social Services head BU 
MA Christopher 
Supple 
Governor's. former chief secretary Duke 
MA Elizabeth 
Scheibel 
Northwestern DA Western New 
England College 
MA Mark Robinson chair of mass port authority BU 
MA Leonard Lewin governor's legal counsel Suffolk 
MT William Mercer Associate Attorney General George Mason 
WIE Steven M. 
Biskupic 
AUSA Marquette 
WIE Vince Biskupic Outagamie County DA Loyola Chicago 
WIE Robert Flancher Racine County DA Marquette 
WIE John Franke Milwaukee county circuit judge Wisconsin 
WIE Michael Nieskes Racine County Deputy DA                                        Wisconsin 
WIE Joseph Paulus Winnebago county DA                                               Wisconsin 
WIE Francis Schmitz AUSA Marquette 
DE Colm F Connolly Duke 
CAC Debra W Yang CA Judge BC 
CAC John Gordon Interim USA Golden Gate Law 
CAC Rod Pacheco Assemblyman, R-Riverside U of San Diego 
CAC Michael 
Bradbury 
Ventura County DA UC Hastings 
CAC Gordon 
Greenberg 
Criminal defense private Chicago-Kent 
SOL 
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CAC Thomas . E 
Holliday 
Private USC 
CAC Uttam S 
Dhillon 
Private Berkeley 
CAC Thomas P 
OBrien 
Deputy DA USD 
CAC Dickran 
Tevrizian 
US District Judge USC 
CAE McGregor 
William Scott 
DA UC Hastings 
CAE John Vincent Head of criminal division at USA's office, 
Acting USA 
Notre Dame 
CAN Kevin 
Vincent Ryan 
CA Municipal Court judge USF 
CAN William 
McGivern Jr 
Marin County Superior Court judge U of SF 
CAN Boris 
Feldman 
Silicon Valley lawyer private Yale 
CAN Joseph P 
Russoniello 
USA NYU 
CAN Michael 
Shepard 
White collar defense lawyer Heller Ehrman, 
federal prosecutor in Chicago 
Stanford 
CAN Timothy 
Crudo 
AUSA Berkeley 
CAN Patrick 
Robbins 
White collar lawyer with Shearman and 
Sterling 
American 
CAS Carol 
ChienHua 
Lam 
AUSA Stanford 
CAS Christopher 
Pace 
San Diego civil attorney Penn 
CAS Jeffrey 
Taylor 
counsel for US Senate Judiciary committee Texas 
CAS Edward 
Allard 
AUSA Western New 
England 
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Barack Obama  
OR Kent Robinson acting USA Georgetown 
OR Josh Marquis Clatsop County DA U of Oregon 
OR S Amanda 
Marshall 
Dep. DA Willamette 
MA Carmen 
Milagros Ortiz 
Federal Prosecutor  GW 
MA Ben T . 
Clements 
Legal counsel to Deval Patrick Cornell 
MA Kathy Wienman President of MA Bar Association Michigan 
MA David Meiner Head of Homicide. Suffolk DA office 
MA Gerard T Leone 
Jr 
Middlesex DA Suffolk 
MA Martin Murphy Private Harvard 
MA Allison 
Burroughs 
AUSA, private Penn 
MA Scott 
Harshbarger 
Civil rights attorney, Middlesex DA, Mass AG Harvard 
MA Karen Green AUSA, deputy chief of civil division in USA 
office, private, judge 
Harvard 
MA Ralph 
Cinquegrana 
Private Boston 
College 
MT Michael W 
Cotter 
US Army Notre Dame 
WIE James L. 
Santelle 
Interim USA, Legal Advisor to US Embassy in 
Baghdad 
Chicago 
WIE David Feiss Assistant DA Wisco 
WIE Alex Flynn Criminal defense- private Marquette 
WIE Richard 
Frohling 
Assistant DA Wisco 
WIE Robert Jambois Assistant DA Wisco 
WIE Mel Johnson AUSA in Milwaukee Wash U 
WIE william 
Lipscomb 
Senior litigation counsel, USA'S office Wisco 
WIE Karine Moreno 
Taxman 
Assistant USA Wisco 
WIE Daniel Vaccaro Assistant USA American 
DE Charles M 
Oberly III 
State Ag; Senate Candidate U of Virginia 
ME Evert Fowle Jr DA U of Maine 
ME Jay McCloskey Former USA U of Maine 
ME Thimi Mina AUSA American 
CAC Andre Birotte Jr AUSA (then private) Pepperdine 
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CAC Brian J 
Hennigan 
Federal prosecutor, then partner at Irell and 
Manella 
Northwestern 
CAC Michael 
Raphael 
Chief of criminal appeals section in US 
attorney's office 
Yale 
CAC Eileen Maura 
Decker 
LA Deputy Mayor for Homeland Security and 
Public Safety 
NYU 
CAC Stephanie 
Yonekura 
Acting USA after Birotte left post UCLA 
CAE Benjamin B 
Wagner 
US Justice Dept resident Legal Advisor in 
Jakarta 
NYU 
CAE Anthony 
Capozzi 
Criminal defense attorney, former State Bar 
president 
U of Toldeo 
CAN Melinda L Haag Federal prosecutor Berkeley 
CAN Matt Jacobs Fed prosecutor Stanford 
CAN Steve Meagher Fed prosecutor UVA 
CAS Laura E Duffy AUSA Creighton  
CAS Kevin Kelly Second in charge at USA office USC 
CAS Jerry coughlan defense lawyer and former prosecutor UVA 
CAS Timothy 
Coughlin 
AUSA Whittier 
 
 
 
 
 
